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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRANDON DAVID WRIGHT, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 970248-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Aggravated 
Robbery, a 1st degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1995) (a copy of the judgment is attached hereto as 
Addendum A), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation and 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995), in refusing to 
reduce defendant's first degree felony conviction to a second 
degree conviction, on the grounds that it lacked the power to 
order such a reduction in sentencing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue presented on appeal is one of 
statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law. State 
v. Bacrshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Ward v. 
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)). Utah appellate 
courts review questions of law under a correction of error 
standard, without deference to the trial court. Bagshaw, 83 6 P.2d 
at 1385; Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 
798 P.2d at 759. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's issue is preserved in the Record on Appeal 
("R.") at 69, 85-97. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute will be determinative of the issue on 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). Conviction of lower 
degree of offense. 
The text of that provision is contained in the attached 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
In July 1996, the state filed an Information against 
Appellant/Defendant Brandon Wright ("Wright") and co-defendant 
Ruston Webber, charging them with aggravated robbery, a 1st 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). 
(R. 6-8.) Thereafter, Wright and the state entered into an 
agreement wherein Wright pled guilty to the offense and the state 
recommended that the trial court sentence Wright to a second 
degree felony, which would reflect a reduction by one degree of 
the offense as charged. (R. 39-46; 69; 96.) 
The trial court sentenced Wright to a first degree felony 
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(R. 51) on the basis that it did not have discretion to reduce 
the sentence, and could only do so if "required by the interests 
of justice." (R. 96.) Wright has appealed from the judgment and 
order. (R. 54-55.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In July 1996, Wright and an accomplice, Ruston Webber, 
allegedly went to Steven Lee's home for money that Webber re-
presented belonged to him. (R. 76-78.) Upon seeing Lee at home, 
Wright allegedly approached him and began striking him in the 
head with a metal table leg. (Id.; 90-92.) 
Wright was later arrested and charged with aggravated rob-
bery, a first degree felony. (R. 6-8.) He and the state subse-
quently entered into an agreement wherein Wright pled guilty to 
the charge and the state recommended that the trial court 
sentence Wright to a second degree felony, which would reflect a 
reduction by one degree of the offense. (R. 39-46; 69; 96.) 
Thereafter, during the sentencing hearing, counsel for 
Wright made a motion to the trial court that the sentence be 
reduced by one degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. (R. 
84-96.) The state stipulated on the record to such a reduction 
in sentencing. (R. 69; 96.) In considering the imposition of the 
reduced sentence, the trial court stated the following: 
I believe the standard that I'm required to consider in 
determining whether or not to sentence a person, who has 
pled guilty to a first degree to a lesser sentence, that is 
a second degree felony, is there is some basis that is 
required by the interest of justice. And I can't find any 
in this case. The reasons that you suggest, Ms. Kreeck-
Mendez[, counsel for Wright], are rational reasons, but 
that's not the basis in the statute so the motion [to reduce 
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the sentence] is denied. 
(R. 96 (emphasis added).) Thereafter, counsel for Wright essen-
tially stated that "in the interest of justice" Wright entered 
into the agreement on the state's recommendation of the reduced 
sentence to avoid spending resources on a trial of the matter. 
(R. 97.) The trial court continued to deny the request. (R. 97.) 
The trial court ordered Wright to be committed to the Utah 
State Prison for the term prescribed by law for a first degree 
felony, "which, in no case, is less than five years but may be 
for as long as the rest of your life." (R. 97.) Because the 
trial court misconstrued and misapplied the statute, Wright has 
appealed from the judgment and asks this Court to remand the case 
with instructions to the trial court to exercise its discretion 
in determining whether Wright's sentence should be reduced by one 
degree, to a second degree felony. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah law, the trial court is required to 
exercise broad discretion with respect to sentencing issues. In 
this case, the trial court misconstrued its authority in that 
context, and ruled that it did not have the power to reduce 
Wright's sentence by one degree unless it was "required" to do so 
by the "interests of justice." Because the trial court failed to 
recognize that it had the discretion to rule on the matter, it 
misapplied the law. This case should be reversed and remanded 
with instructions that the trial court exercise its discretion in 
ruling on the sentencing issue in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD ITS AUTHORITY TO REDUCE 
WRIGHT'S SENTENCE, 
A. ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION WITH 
RESPECT TO SENTENCING ISSUES, THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS MATTER 
DEEMED IT HAD NO POWER TO REDUCE WRIGHTfS SENTENCE AS THE 
PARTIES REQUESTED. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995) allows the trial court to 
reduce a sentence during the sentencing proceeding by one degree. 
It provides in pertinent part the following: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was 
found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of offense established 
by statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative 
normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly. 
• * * 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this 
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing 
or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two 
degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that Section 76-3-402 
provides the trial court with discretion during sentencing to 
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. See State v. Theison, 
709 P.2d 307, 308 n.l. (Utah 1985); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 879 (Utah 1981) (trial court reduced sentence in accordance 
with its "statutory prerogative"); State v. Harding, 576 P.2d 
1284 n.3 (Utah 1978). 
[The trial] court in fact has very wide discretion in 
sentencing. A court may sentence a defendant to a prison 
term, impose a fine, enter judgment for a lower category of 
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offense pursuant to § 76-3-402. place him on probation, 
disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to § 
76-3-201, sentence the defendant to serve prison terms 
concurrently or consecutively, order the defendant to pay 
restitution, or suspend a prison sentence. As pointed out 
in the dissent of Justice Wilkins in Reddish v. Smith, 
supra, this wide variety of alternatives not only permits, 
but absolutely requires, the exercise of discretion. 
State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980) (emphasis 
added). 
In State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982), defendant 
argued on appeal that the trial court erred in determining it had 
no power to reduce a sentence from a felony to a misdemeanor. The 
Utah Supreme Court refused to address the issue on the grounds 
that defendant failed to provide any reference to the lengthy 
record in support of his contention: "[T]he record appears to be 
silent on whether the court denied defendant's request for the 
reason he claims or on the merits in the exercise of the court's 
broad discretion in sentencing matters." Id. at 1267 n.7. 
In State v. Baashaw, 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1992), 
defendant argued the trial court misinterpreted its ability to 
reduce a sentence under the 1990 version of Section 76-3-402, 
resulting in misapplication of the statute. The state agreed and 
this Court reversed the entry of class A misdemeanors and ordered 
that they be further reduced consistent with the applicable 
language of Section 76-3-402. 
In this case, the trial court misconstrued its power to 
reduce a sentence, and misapplied the statute. The trial court 
stated that the standard it was "required to consider" was 
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whether there was a basis "required" by the "interest of justice" 
permitting the reduction. The trial court supplanted its 
prerogative for a more restrictive standard that replaces the 
general balancing made when the court exercises broad discretion, 
with rigid inquiry that restricts the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion. (R. 96.) The trial court clearly expressed a powerless-
ness with respect to entertaining the reduction request, "the 
standard that I'm required to consider . . . [is whether] there 
is some basis that is required by the interest of justice." (R. 
96.) It erred in its interpretation of its powers under the 
statute, and it failed to recognize that it was not only 
empowered, but required, to exercise broad discretion in the 
matter. Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1244. 
1. The Broad Discretion Standard Accommodates a General 
Balancing of Factors. 
Wright is not suggesting that the "interests-of-justice" 
inquiry and judicial "discretion" are incompatible. In other 
matters, case law and statutory law allow the courts to exercise 
"discretion" to further the "interests of justice." See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 51 (1997) ("[T]he appellate court, in its discretion and 
in the interests of justice may review the giving of or failure 
to give an instruction"); Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292 
(Utah 1992) (trial court in its discretion may allow pleading 
amendments in the interests of justice under Utah R. Civ. P. 15); 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
In such cases, discretion mandates the broadest inquiry into 
the nature of the challenged proceeding. Appellate review of the 
7 
"very wide" discretionary standard results in reversal only if 
there is evidence of abuse. State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 
(Utah App. 1995) (sentencing decisions reviewed for abuse of 
discretion). In this case, the trial court was required to 
employ the "very wide discretion" standard. Instead, it employed 
an "interest-of-justice" inquiry that substantially restricted 
the court in exercising its discretion, as set forth below. 
2. Utah Appellate Courts Have Restricted the Interest-of-
Justice Inquiry in Other Contexts, Which in Turn Restricts 
the Trial Court's Exercise of Discretion in the Challenged 
Proceeding. 
In certain evidentiary matters the trial court is required 
to determine whether the interests of justice "will best be 
served" by the court's ruling. That inquiry requires the trial 
court to engage in a specific analysis, limiting its discretion 
and subjecting the ruling to a more critical review on appeal. 
State v. Snvder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah App. 1997). 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 (1995) provides that a 
child victim's out-of-court statement regarding sexual abuse is 
admissible as evidence, even if it does not qualify under an 
existing hearsay exception, if inter alia, the judge determines 
"the interest of justice will best be served by admission of that 
statement." Id. The Utah Supreme Court has limited the trial 
court's scope of analysis under that standard. 
[T]he trial court must make an in-depth evaluation of the 
proposed testimony as required by subsection 76-5-411(1). 
This inquiry may require consideration of some matters not 
specifically mentioned in the statute. For example, to 
determine the reliability of the statement, a court should 
consider how soon after the event it was given, whether the 
statement was spontaneous, the questions asked to elicit it, 
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the number of times the statement was repeated or rehearsed, 
and whether the statement is reproduced verbatim in court, 
viz., tape recording, video tape, or otherwise. The trial 
court should then enter findings and conclusions regarding 
each of the factors listed in the statute to explain its 
reasons for admitting or excluding the testimony. 
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355 n. 3 (Utah 1986) (cites 
omitted); Snyder, 932 P.2d at 132. The considerations placed on 
the trial court in making its determination are rigid. 
In another context, the court is required to consider 
whether a challenged proceeding mandates a specific result in the 
interest of justice. That is the standard the trial court 
applied in Wright's case in determining whether it could enter an 
order reducing Wright's sentence by one degree. That standard is 
employed to limit court discretion in the proceeding, as set 
forth in the following cases. 
In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that legislative enactments will not be stricken 
"unless the interests of justice require the same because the law 
is clearly in conflict with that set forth in the constitution. 
Indeed, this Court has a duty to construe a statute whenever 
possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or 
save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities." Id. at 397 
(emphasis added; notes omitted); Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 
80 (Utah 1981). In such cases, if the interest of justice 
requires, the presumption of constitutionality is rebutted. The 
inquiry articulates a basis for finding an exception to a general 
rule, or for rebutting a presumption. 
9 
Stated in terms of this case, assuming arguendo the trial 
court was prohibited, as it articulated, from reducing a sentence 
unless there was "some basis that [was] required by the interest 
of justice," (R. 96) that standard suggests the presumption is 
against reduction of the sentence unless the interests of justice 
compel a different result. That standard is rigid and less 
deferential to the trial court than the "very wide discretionary" 
standard articulated in Lipsky for sentencing matters. 
To further illustrate the point, in Anderson v. Public 
Service Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the court 
reiterated that "as a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked 
against a government entity," except in "unusual circumstances 
'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.'11 
Id. at 827 (emphasis added). Unusual circumstances compel an 
exception to the general rule. The exception applies "only if 
'the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice 
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." 
Id.; see also, Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 
P.2d 789 (Utah App. 1991). Such a standard does not accommodate 
the kind of "very wide" trial court discretion found in 
sentencing. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Casarez, 656 
P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), also illustrates the severity of the 
inquiry applied by the trial court in this case. In Casarez, 
defendant challenged imposition of a sentence against him on the 
basis that prior to sentencing, the state failed to give him 
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access to his presentence report as required by law. Utah law 
recognized that "'fundamental fairness' require[d] that a 
defendant have the right to inspect" such a presentence report 
"prior to sentencing so that a sentence [would] not be influenced 
by inaccurate information." Id. at 1007. 
The state argued that the statute governing disclosure of 
such reports had been amended, justifying "the trial court's 
discretionary refusal to give the defendant the presentence 
report." Id. (emphasis added). According to the amended statute, 
the court "may disclose all or parts of the [presentence] report 
to the defendant or his counsel as the interest of justice 
requires." Id. (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the "interest of justice" provision must be construed to 
create a very rare possibility, allowing the concealing of the 
presentence report only when disclosure might lead to harm of a 
third person. 
That provision was not intended to make disclosure of a 
presentence report depend on a personal whim or a 
subjective standard of an individual judge. The interests at 
stake are far too important for that. Rather, the 
Legislature expressly provided that the exercise of 
discretion should be guided as "the interest of justice 
requires." Under that standard, it is the exceptional case 
where full disclosure is not justified. Only when 
disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize the 
life or safety of third parties, should there be deletions 
from the report to protect them. 
Id. at 1008. The court clarified that given the due process im-
plications, the trial court would be required to disclose the 
report except in specific circumstances. The trial court's 
statutory "discretion" in that instance was severely restricted 
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to specific considerations "as the interest of justice required." 
Inasmuch as the trial court in this case stated that it was 
"required to consider" whether there was some basis "required by 
the interest of justice" for reducing Wright's sentence, the 
trial court implicated a rigid inquiry that does not permit the 
exercise of broad discretion. Such an inquiry does not apply in 
the context of this case. The trial court applied the wrong 
standard to its determination. It should have exercised the "very 
wide discretion" applicable to sentencing issues in this case. 
In this matter, the state twice stipulated to a reduction in 
sentencing. (R. 69 and 96.) Because the parties cannot be sure 
that the trial court would have rejected the stipulated motion if 
it had properly exercised its discretion, the case should be 
reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court 
properly consider the motion. 
B. WRIGHT'S APPEAL DOES NOT IMPLICATE "PRESERVATION" 
ISSUES. 
In this case Wright requested that the trial court reduce 
his conviction to the next lower category of offense. (R. 85-
97.) That is sufficient to preserve the issue concerning 
improper sentencing. See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 
(Utah 1994) (defendant waived issue where he failed to request 
that trial court reduce conviction to the "next lower category of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly"). 
In the event this Court finds that the issue was not 
properly preserved, notwithstanding the 12 pages of transcript 
dedicated to the motion to reduce sentencing, Wright maintains 
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that the trial court's expression that it could not entertain the 
issue without some basis "required by the interest of justice" 
constitutes plain error. Under the plain error doctrine, the 
appellate court "balance[s] the need for procedural regularity 
with the demands of fairness." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 
158 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
The doctrine considers whether the trial court failed to 
engage in conduct that was required under the law in existence at 
the time of the act in question. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 
937, 940 (Utah 1996). At the time the trial court ruled on 
Wright's motion to reduce his sentence by one degree, the trial 
court obviously misconstrued its authority to exercise broad 
discretion over the matter. The error would be obvious to the 
reasonable trial court. Utah precedent on this subject is clear: 
[The trial] court in fact has very wide discretion in 
sentencing. A court may sentence a defendant to a prison 
term, impose a fine, enter judgment for a lower category of 
offense vursuant to § 76-3-402, place him on probation, 
disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to § 
76-3-201, sentence the defendant to serve prison terms 
concurrently or consecutively, order the defendant to pay 
restitution, or suspend a prison sentence. As pointed out 
in the dissent of Justice Wilkins in Reddish v. Smith, 
supra, this wide variety of alternatives not only permits, 
but absolutely requires, the exercise of discretion. 
Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added); Theison, 709 P.2d at 
308 n.l; Brooks, 631 P.2d at 879; Harding 576 P.2d at 1284 n.3. 
Failure to exercise "very wide discretion" over the matter should 
be treated as plain error, since it is "absolutely require[d]" 
under the case law. See State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 
1996) . 
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Further, in this case, the obvious error of expressing 
powerlessness with respect to ruling on a sentencing issue serves 
no conceivable strategic purpose. Indeed, the state twice 
stipulated to the entry of a reduced sentence, which was rejected 
by the trial court because it mistakenly believed its powers in 
considering the matter were limited. Since the parties cannot be 
sure that the trial court would have rejected the motion to 
reduce Wright's sentence if the trial court had exercised its 
discretion in the matter, the error was prejudicial. 
"Because this case involves a sentencing error rather than a 
trial error, the error is obvious on the face of the record and 
undeniably prejudicial." Labrum, 925 P.2d at 941. The error was 
a manifest violation of case law, it was plain and it was 
harmful. The case should be remanded so that all parties involved 
may have the benefit of the trial court's discretion in deciding 
the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Wright respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this IH& day of CLU^L, , 1997. 
LINDA M. JONES 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DEBORAH KREECK-MENDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
E. THOMPSON 
E. AMBROSE 
J . WEISS 
JAN. 3, 1997 
13 The motion of DEFT to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted 8 denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of AGGRAVATFD RDRRFRY a felony 
of the J: degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by KREECKMENDE^rl the State being represented by R MCCLOSKEX now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
years and which may be for life; D to a maximum mandatory term of. 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
X3 of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
>C and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ? nnn P I I K 8 5% SURCHARGE 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
X DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS " v , x — 
1-7-1-7 
8- 1^ 
"TTE1 D such sentence is to run concurrently witn 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, a Defense, a Court, Count(s) — 
>£j RECOUPMENT ORDERED TO SALT LAKE COUNTY 
!ED3 TO 6C. AW MENTAL HLALIH ibSUES 
are hereby dismissed. 
FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN AMOUNT OF $V 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attachec^conditions of probation. 
£3 Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Coumy ^ for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail/where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
fa Commitment shall issue FORTHWITH. 
DATED this ? day of 
CC: COUNSEL DISTBIGT. COURT JUDGE 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Defense Counsel 
lu K£ 
Deputy County Attorney Page 





Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 1210. 
§ 552. 
C.J.S. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1522, 
1523. 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant 
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to 
be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor 
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class 
A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is 
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of 
probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, 
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the 
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining 
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-402, enacted by L. subsection designations in Subsection (2)(b), 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-402; 1983, ch. 88, § 6; added Subsections (2)(b)(iii) and (3), redesig-
1991, ch. 7, § 1. nated former Subsection (3) as present Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- tion (4), and made minor changes in punctua-
ment, effective April 29,1991, twice substituted tion and style throughout the section, 
"degree" for "category" in Subsection (1), in- Cross-References. — Expungement and 
serted "third degree" and %lass A" in the intro-
 s ealing of records, § 77-18-9 et seq.; Rule 
ductory paragraph of^Subsection (2), twice in-
 4 . 2 0 7 , Rules of Judicial Administration, 
serted "class A m Subsection (2)(a), added the 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Appeal. 
. When a conviction is reduced under this 
Appeal. section, the appeal lies in the court having 
Applicability of 1991 amendment. jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in 
Felonies. the judgment of conviction and for which defen-
Cited. dant is sentenced, rather than the degree of 
83 
